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he 35-year experiment in deregulation of the *nancial 
markets created an environment in which innovative 
instruments and structures could be rapidly distribut-
ed around the world by their inventors (primarily, the 
largest banks) with little or no consideration of con-
sequences, aside from potential pro*ts.  Information 
technology and the use of advanced valuation algo-
rithms and statistics enabled the banking industry to 
create and market hundreds of *nancial products, many of which are so complicated 
that understanding them challenges even the most sophisticated market participants.
;e *rst paper in this series discusses a groundbreaking study by ;omas Philip-
pon of New York University’s Stern School of Management.1  Professor Philippon 
concluded that the cost of intermediation between the suppliers of capital and the 
productive consumers of capital has increased dramatically over the last 35 years 
notwithstanding IT advances, sophisticated quantitative analysis, massive trading 
volume increases and diversity in *nancial and derivatives markets that, intuitively, 
should have increased transactional e+ciencies. ;is is signi*cant because capital 
intermediation2 is the core social function provided by the *nancial system.
 
Philippon ascribed this surprising result to increased volume, but the *rst paper pro-
posed that it was the quality of the trading activity rather than the quantity that was 
the root cause.  It describes how advances in technology and quantitative analysis 
have led to asymmetric information advantages for sophisticated market participants 
that allow them to extract net value from the markets, a source of capital intermedi-
ation ine+ciency.
;e second paper described how changes to the characteristics of securities trading 
increase the cost of capital intermediation as well as increase market volume and 
derivatives. ;is high volume trading, primarily high frequency trading powered 
by supercomputers and following complex algorithmic so:ware, has reduced the 
reliability of market pricing mechanisms. In many cases, the HFT algorithms are 
designed to manipulate individual transactions. But even when it does not target 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
T
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discreet transactions, HFT impairs market reliability enabling the *nancial sector to 
exploit market distortions to extract value. Investors must price this unreliability into 
their investment decisions, further burdening the capital intermediation process.
;is paper will explore the most important product innovation during the period 
of deregulation: Derivatives, *nancial instruments that detach the price risks and 
rewards from assets so that these risks and rewards can be allocated to a party without 
regard to interests in the underlying asset.
;is discussion will describe derivatives in an entirely new way. Derivatives will be 
shown to constitute an essential element of the capital intermediation function. ;is 
di,ers signi*cantly from the conventional view of derivatives as devices to eliminate 
risks.
;e paper will then identify the costs of derivatives to the capital intermediation 
process and to the broad economy. ;ese cost ine+ciencies derive primarily from 
inaccurate valuation of *nancially engineered derivatives, leading to both mispric-
ing and under-valuation of risk. ;e cost of entering into a derivative contract is 
generally very high, and the value of the contract received is much lower than typi-
cally understood. Sophisticated *nancial institutions understand these ine+ciencies 
marginally better than other market participants and use this advantage to exploit 
them, to the detriment of the overall economy. ;us, derivatives are a major source of 
value extraction by the *nancial sector that renders the core function of the *nancial 
system, capital intermediation, less e+cient and less stable.
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n policy and, too o:en, academic discourse, 
“innovation” carries a positive connotation. But 
the social implications of an innovation can be 
complex and o:en negative. Albert Einstein ar-
ticulated the mathematics of physical relation-
ships between mass and energy.  But one prac-
tical application was nuclear weapons, and the 
consequences for the world have been mixed, to 
say the least. Similarly, the quantitative experts 
at the big banks have generated complex analyses of relationships among prices 
within and across asset classes: debt, equity, currencies and commodities. New 
*nancial instruments that are designed to re>ect the relationships identi*ed by 
the “quants” have proliferated. Innovation in the *nancial markets can be useful, 
but also harmful. As with Einstein’s work, some of the consequences of *nancial 
innovations are dangerous and volatile.
Well-regarded scholars have been remarkably tolerant of the emerging dangers 
from innovative *nancial engineering. Notably, Robert Merton, whose research 
provided the analytical foundation for derivatives markets, observed as follows:
As we all know, there have been financial “incidents,” and even crises, that 
cause some to raise questions about innovations and the scientific soundness 
of the financial theories used to engineer them. There have surely been 
individual cases of faulty engineering designs and faulty implementations of 
those designs in finance just as there have been in building bridges, airplanes, 
and silicon chips. Indeed, learning from (sometimes even tragic) mistakes is 
an integral part of the process of technical progress.3
To be fair, the quoted passage dates from before the *nancial crisis. Nonetheless, it 
expresses a widely held biased view that *nancial innovation, by de*nition, serves 
a public good that outweighs harm caused by a few unfortunate crises along the 
way. And it is particularly ironic that it comes from Merton, who was an integral 
player in the failure of Long Term Capital Management, a precursor to the 2008 
crisis which is described in detail below.
I
I N N O VAT I O N  I N  T H E 
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;e *nancial services industry has o:en raised the specter that *nancial market 
regulation will sti>e innovation and thus, by de*nition, burden markets and the 
economy as a whole.4  Paul Krugman’s perspective on *nancial innovation identi*es 
an important, endogenous cost that challenges this assertion, the obfuscation of risk:
(T)he innovations of recent years—the alphabet soup of C.D.O.’s and S.I.V.’s, 
R.M.B.S. and A.B.C.P.—were sold on false pretenses. They were promoted as 
ways to spread risk, making investment safer. What they did instead—aside from 
making their creators a lot of money, which they didn’t have to repay when it all 
went bust—was to spread confusion, luring investors into taking on more risk than 
they realized. [Emphasis added]5
Paul Volcker has famously expressed a similar view: “the most important *nancial in-
novation that I have seen the past 20 years is the automatic teller machine.”6 Perhaps 
more telling is a story he recounted that expands on his quip:
A few years ago I happened to be at a conference of business people, not 
financial people, and I was making a presentation. The conference was being 
addressed by a very vigorous young investment banker from London who was 
explaining to all these older executives how their companies would be dust if 
they did not realize the joys of financial innovation and financial engineering, 
and that they had better get with it.
I was listening to this, and I found myself sitting next to one of the inventors 
of financial engineering. I didn’t know him, but I knew who he was and that 
he had won a Nobel Prize, and I nudged him and asked what all the financial 
engineering does for the economy and what it does for productivity.
Much to my surprise, he leaned over and whispered in my ear that it does 
nothing—and this was from a leader in the world of financial engineering. I 
asked him what it did do, and he said that it moves around the rents in the 
financial system—and besides, it’s a lot of intellectual fun.
Now, I have no doubts that it moves around the rents in the financial system, but 
not only this, as it seems to have vastly increased them. [Emphasis added]7
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Chairman Volcker identi*es a second, but related, mechanism driving costs of in-
termediation higher: the allocation of higher and higher economic rents8 to the 
*nancial sector associated with innovative instruments. Ever-higher rents have 
been disproportionately allocated to dominant market participants. Innovation 
has become a means to extract value from the markets. As Professor Krugman ob-
served, investors are ill equipped to understand the value of these products, espe-
cially when compared with the analytic capacity of the banks that invented them. 
;erefore, there is great incentive for dominant market participants to introduce 
and market innovations just to cause aggregate rents to increase.
;is paper will articulate a theory that innovation in the *nancial markets has 
made the process of intermediation between suppliers of capital and productive 
consumers of capital less e+cient. Innovation in the form of engineering of *nan-
cial products has thus reduced the e+ciency of capital intermediation, the central 
social purpose of the *nancial markets.  
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he most signi*cant *nancial innovations are tradable contracts that 
allow market participants to experience the *nancial consequences 
of rising or falling prices of asset classes without actually owning 
the assets. ;ese contracts synthesize the *nancial consequences 
of owning an interest in the asset. For example, instead of owning 
a barrel of oil, an investor can “own” changes in the price of oil, up or down, from a 
set date to the end of the contract term. ;ese “*nancial products,” known as deriva-
tives, are based on dynamic measurement of value over time. ;eir utility to investors 
is completely dependent on statistical forecasts of price movements based on historic 
observations.
Derivatives could not exist without the ability to value them on a continuous basis. 
Price volatility, the frequency and amplitude of price movements, is a key factor in 
dynamic valuation of derivatives. ;e basic tool for measuring the value and risk of 
volatility is the Black-Scholes Option Pricing model *rst described by Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes in 1973 and subsequently re*ned by Black, Scholes and Robert Merton. 
Scholes and Merton won the Nobel Prize for this work (Black had passed away) in 1997. 
By that time, Scholes and Merton had become principals in an investment fund called 
Long-Term Capital Management that developed a “fool-proof ” strategy to make money 
based on quantitative analysis, speci*cally elaborations on the Black-Scholes model. 
Within a year of their receipt of the Nobel Prize, LTCM had gone bust. It was bailed 
out by a consortium of Wall Street banks under the supervision of the Treasury De-
partment and the Fed to avoid a systemic crisis, a precursor to the *nancial crisis of 
2008. LTCM was a “hedge fund,” a trading business that uses complex mathematics to 
implement investment strategies with other people’s money. Much of the $130 billion 
invested in LTCM came from the large Wall Street banks and its failure threatened to 
migrate throughout the *nancial system. 
;e irony is inescapable. ;e 1998 failure of LTCM should have been a warning signal 
of the dangers of complex *nancial innovation.  Instead, derivatives were freed from 
regulation by act of Congress in 2000.9 ;e stage was set for the growth of the US 
derivatives markets from a negligible amount to $60 trillion per year in the 10 years 
preceding the 2008 *nancial crisis. ;e total notional value of derivatives currently in 
T
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existence is at least $600 trillion, though some estimates are as high as $1.2 quadrillion 
(which is 20 times world GDP).10
;e business of Wall Street changed dramatically during this period. Since the New Deal, 
it had been divided between commercial banking (taking deposits and making loans) 
and investment banking (underwriting public securities o,erings, mergers and acquisi-
tions and, much less important, trading). ;e Glass Steagall Act that separated them was 
repealed in 1999. ;e combination of commercial and investment banking coincided 
with the rise of trading driven by massive increases in trading revenues in the deregu-
lated environment. It has been estimated that two-thirds of the revenues from trading 
came from derivatives.11 Trading and traders now ruled on Wall Street and derivatives 
dominate trading. 
;e credit default swap is a notable example of a derivative. A credit default swap rep-
licates the risk/reward results of owning a corporate bond. A market participant can 
synthetically experience the consequences of owning (or selling short12) a bond without 
actually owning it (or shorting it). 
With CDS, the aggregate amount of risk associated with a company’s or a government’s 
bonds that is borne by all market participants is no longer limited by the amount of 
bonds that can be issued and purchased. By synthesizing the default risk of a corporation 
or government, the amount of that risk exposure can be multiplied many times over and 
propagated throughout the world.  All derivatives, regardless of the underlying asset, 
share this property with CDS. ;is innovation produced terrible consequences when it 
was applied to mortgage-backed securities, as the risk of mortgage default borne by the 
economy was multiplied many times over just ahead of the crash of the housing market. 
;ere is no doubt that this phenomenon can recur in other asset classes.
Derivatives  Primer
Derivatives are the foundation for most of the *nancial engineering of the last thirty-*ve 
years.  Valuation and risk metrics for derivatives involve devilishly complex mathemat-
ics, but their structure is relatively straightforward.  One need not be a “quant” to under-
stand how they work and how they a,ect the e+ciency of capital markets.
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Understanding the basic principles underlying derivatives is essential to evaluating their 
e,ect on the economy. Financial institutions have consistently described derivatives in 
language that is designed to make them appear benign to customers and regulators. De-
rivatives are characterized as “*nancial products,” as if they are they are commodities that 
have been produced for sale, rather than synthetic derivatives of actual products. More 
importantly, they are said to reduce risk. ;is facile description is constantly parroted 
by academics and policy makers. A new and more accurate description is badly needed.
Many readers of this paper will already have an understanding of the mechanics of de-
rivatives, but some will not. ;e following explanation provides a basic description of 
derivatives, but one that di,ers from the conventional description of derivatives in ways 
that are vital to understanding the cost that they exact on capital intermediation.  Even 
though some readers may *nd a portion of the explanation to be basic, it is hoped that 
the insights will be useful even for those familiar with derivatives.
;e fundamental characteristic of a derivative is that it is a bilateral contract between two 
parties, requiring performance in the future.  It is not an asset like a share of stock or a 
barrel of oil. An existing derivative is not sold to another party. If a derivative counter-
party wants to eliminate a derivative price risk from its book, it must enter into a contract 
that is the same, but take on the opposite obligations. ;e new “opposite way” derivative 
o,sets the *rst derivative, but only if the party on the other side performs its obligations.
;e value to a counterparty of a derivative on any given day during its life involves two 
central properties of the contract:
t ;e expected *nancial value of the performance in the future by the other party 
to the contract; and
t ;e likelihood that the required performance by the other party will not occur 
and that the expected *nancial value will not be realized (giving rise to credit 
exposures between the counterparties, as described below).
;e values of these properties can be, and typically are, measured independently. 
However, measurement of these values and how they interact, even for a simply struc-
tured derivative, is a complex task.
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All derivatives are swaps, but they may have di,erent names based on the bells and 
whistles that are added, such as “futures” and “options.”13  A swap is a contract to ex-
change one value for another, the value most o:en being the price of a security or other 
asset (the “referenced asset”).  Swaps are structured on hundreds of di,erent “prices,” 
including prices of equity shares, currencies, energy and agricultural commodities, pre-
cious and commercial metals and debt (in the form of interest rates or component of 
interest rates, like credit standing of the debtor). 
Derivatives are engineered from two basic building blocks: forward prices and options.14 
;ese building blocks are used to construct relatively simple derivatives and are also 
packaged in various combinations to create new and more esoteric products. 
Swaps  on  Forward  Prices
A forward price, as of any date, is the expected price of a referenced asset on a speci*ed 
date in the future.  For example, a simple oil price swap is based on a future delivery date 
and location and a quantity.  A common contract might refer to June delivery of 100 
barrels of crude oil at Cushing, Oklahoma, a major distribution pipeline hub. 
One of the values to be exchanged in the future may be *xed and determined at the 
inception of the contract.  ;e performance required of one of the parties (we will call 
him or her “Party A”) is payment of a set dollar amount. ;is payment is calculated in 
our common example as the market value, at the inception of the swap, of 100 barrels 
of oil to be delivered in June at Cushing, Oklahoma.  If the current forward price for a 
barrel of oil to be delivered in June is $100, a simple swap on 100 barrels of oil would 
require a *xed payment by Party A in June of $10,000. 
All swaps involve swapping one value for another. At least one of the values is an amount 
based on a price to be determined de*nitively in the future. In our example, the other 
party to the oil price swap (“Party B”) is required to pay an amount in June equal to the 
then current price of 100 barrels of oil delivered at Cushing.  ;us, the values exchanged 
on performance of the contract are today’s forward price for oil delivered in June and 
the actual price for oil delivered in June.
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For Party A, the realized *nancial value of the future performance of Party B depends 
on the delivery price in June.  If that price is higher than the forward price at inception 
of the swap (i.e., Party A’s *xed payment obligation), the swap will have a positive value 
for Party A equal to the excess.  If it is lower, the swap will have a negative value to Party 
A equal to the amount the price has gone down since inception. Party B’s value in each 
of these cases will be the inverse. 
To put numbers on it, remember the example in which the June forward price of oil was 
$100 per barrel at the inception of the swap, resulting in a *xed payment by Party A of 
$10,000.  If the price per barrel is $120 on the performance date in June, Party B will be 
required to pay $12,000.  A:er netting out the *xed payment by Party A, Party B is out 
$2000, which is also the bene*t to Party A.  But if the price is $80 per barrel, Party B will 
receive, and Party A will pay, $2000 on a net basis.
Party
A
Party
B
Inception price 
of 100 barrels of oil 
in June at Cushing
June price of 
100 barrels of oil 
in June at Cushing
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Swaps are most o:en used to hedge (meaning o,set) a price exposure in the market 
for the referenced commodity or *nancial instrument.  If Party A is certain that he or 
she is going to buy 100 barrels of oil at Cushing in June, Party A now knows (subject 
to performance by Party B) the *nancial consequence of the purchase.  ;e combined 
e,ect of the swap and payment of the purchase price is the same as if the oil price in 
June were identical to the forward price at inception of the swap.  Party A must pay 
the going price for 100 barrels of oil in June, but payments from Party B will o,set the 
actual purchase price. Party A will pay Party B $100 times the number of barrels, the 
price at inception. From inception, Party A knows that he or she will e,ectively pay 
$100 per barrel so long as Party B performs. 
F I G U R E  2 .  |  PAYM E N T S  AT  C L O S E  O F  S WA P  C O N T R A C T
Oil Seller
Party
A
Party
B
$100/Barrel
$120/Barrel
Pur
cha
se P
rice
$12
0/B
arre
l
Actual price/Barrel
In June
$100
$80 $10,000 $8,000
Party A Fixed Payment 
($100/Barrel)
$10,000
Party B
Floating Payment
$10,000
($2,000)
Value to Party A
$0
$2000
$120 $10,000 $12,000 $2,000 ($2000)
Value to Party B
$0
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;e same is true for Party B if Party B is certain that he or she will be selling 100 
barrels of oil at Cushing in June.  Both have exchanged the potential loss from an 
adverse price change for the potential pro*t from a favorable price change.  ;is ex-
change of price consequences generates the *nancial value of the derivative, the *rst 
characteristic of the swap that determines its value. 
It is o:en said that derivatives transfer risk. However, they actually transfer the con-
sequence of a price change. ;at consequence might be positive or negative.  If the 
June price is $120, the price consequence to Party A is positive because of the swap. 
If it is $80, the consequence is negative. If the forward price at inception of $100 is 
reliable, there are equal probabilities of negative and positive outcomes for Party A. 
So, the swap eliminates both risk of loss from an adverse price movement and the 
equally probable potential reward from a favorable price change. While the purvey-
ors of swaps o:en ignore the transfer of potential reward, it is impossible to evaluate 
the rationale for entering into a swap without calculating the cost of giving up the 
potential reward.
Probability  of  Performance 
and  Credit  Extension
On each date prior to the de*nitive determination of the >oating payment, the 
accrued value of the swap is based on the forward price on that date. ;us, the 
dynamic accrued value of any derivative over its life is dependent on the movement 
of a referenced forward price over a speci*ed time period (i.e., the duration of the 
swap contract). 
Assuming that the *xed payment (made by Party A) is accurately based on the June 
Cushing forward price at inception, the swap initially has no intrinsic *nancial value. 
At inception, the expected amount to be paid by Party B is the same as the *xed 
amount to be paid by Party A. As soon as the June Cushing forward price changes, 
however, value accrues.  If the price increases the very next day a:er inception by $1, 
Party A accrues that positive value; if it decreases by $1, the accrued positive value is 
Party B’s.  ;e counterparty in each case accrues an equal negative value.
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But, in contrast with this accrued value, the realized *nancial value is not actually 
known until performance is completed.  ;e swap is a contract that has realized value 
only if the other party performs. It is not an asset that can be converted to cash by 
selling it on a date chosen by the owner.  If Party A accrues a $1 value for each barrel, 
that value is at risk if Party B goes bankrupt or otherwise fails to perform.  Party A is 
exposed to the credit of Party B.  Party A can replace the swap immediately if Party 
B goes bankrupt. But the replacement swap will have a new inception date and, on 
that date, the June forward price is $1 higher in our example.  ;erefore, the *xed 
payment is based on a $1 higher price for 100 barrels. ;e consequence to Party A 
when June comes around is $100 worse.
F I G U R E  3 .  |  S WA P  L O S T  O N  P O T E N T I A L  D E FAU LT
A has extended $1/barrel of Credit to B.
;is consequence is exactly the same as if Party A had loaned $100 to Party B and 
then Party B went bust.  Party A has extended credit to Party B.15
Party
A
Party
X
$10,100 @ $101/Barrel
Actual June Price
Party
A
Party
B
$10,000 @ $100/Barrel
Actual June Price
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;is illustrates the second embedded property of a swap that determines its value.  At 
any time the swap has a *nancial value based on the current forward price; but it also 
involves an extension of credit that has a separate value or cost. In a loan, the value 
and cost of an extension of credit is expressed as an interest rate. In a derivative, the 
credit extension has a parallel value or cost, but it its expression is obscured because 
it is embedded in the pricing of the swap. For example, the >oating leg of the swap 
might be set at the June Cushing price less 50 cents. ;is compensates Party B for the 
potential extension of credit to Party A. Sophisticated derivatives counterparties price 
in potential credit extension using complex statistics measuring probable amounts of 
credit extended, especially if they have market power to demand it. 
Uniformly banks price-in credit exposure, while, typically, businesses and govern-
ments that are the banks’ counterparties do not. Only banks and a few businesses are 
sophisticated enough to understand and price credit extension. ;e author has had 
more than one conversation with relatively sophisticated *nance o+cers and treasur-
ers who believe that large banks simply extend this credit at no cost. It is inconceivable 
that a bank would do this and, in fact, the trader who transacts the derivative is always 
provided a charge for credit exposure that he or she passes through.
More importantly, only the banks (and, in particular businesses sectors, other powerful 
entities, such as big oil companies in energy) have the market power to demand com-
pensation for potential credit exposure. Currently, the four largest banks control 94% 
of the bank derivatives business in the US.16 ;erefore, the large banks can demand 
compensation for the extension of credit inherent in swap, and they can also avoid 
paying compensation to counterparties.
;e amount of this credit extension can be determined at any time so long as reli-
able market forward prices are available. However, there is no cap on the amount of 
credit extension that can accrue.  Prices, in theory, can go sky high or sink like a stone. 
;erefore, the value or cost of any credit extension also has no cap.  In this way, credit 
extended in a swap is much riskier than the extension of credit in a conventional loan.
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Margining  and  Demands  on  Cash  L iquidity
As described above, the changing accrued value of a swap generates credit exposures 
during the term of the swap. (See Figure 3) ;ese credit exposures are not capped. An 
exposure’s size is measured by the movement of the referenced forward price during 
the life of the swap and this price movement has no limit. 
To protect against losses, banks generally require that credit exposures be fully or 
partially collateralized by their counterparties. ;is is referred to as “margining.” If 
a swap’s credit exposures are fully collateralized, the bank will require that the full 
amount of credit exposure as of the prior day’s close of business be on deposit in 
an account that secures the bank. If the forward price moves in the bank’s favor, the 
amount of margin required to be on deposit the next day increases. If the forward 
price moves in favor of the counterparty, margin collateral can be withdrawn.
Since the amount of credit extended under a swap is uncapped and unpredictable, 
margin can pose severe cash liquidity risk to the counterparty.  In a volatile price 
environment, the challenge can be greater as prices move by relatively large amounts 
over short periods of time. In the real world, the threat based of the need to access 
cash immediately is the most dangerous element in the use of derivatives.
Generally, banks allow counterparties to accumulate credit exposure up to a cap 
before they must make a deposit of margin collateral. ;ese are typically referred to 
as “margin thresholds.” Banks treat margin thresholds like revolving loans, decre-
menting credit capacity to lend to the swap counterparty on an unsecured basis for 
all purposes. 
Banks also require “credit triggers,” provisions that require full margin collateraliza-
tion, regardless of thresholds, if the credit of the swap counterparty deteriorates. ;e 
most common trigger is a downgrade by a credit rating agency. ;e implementation 
of a credit trigger is the extreme form of the dreaded “margin call.” One need only 
recall the credit default swap margin call made on AIG in 2008 that precipitated its 
bailout in the amount of $185 billion. Margin calls have bankrupted many businesses 
and governments around the world.
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A credit rating downgrade trigger means that the business or government must come 
up with cash at precisely the time that cash is most di+cult to secure.  ;is ampli*es 
the cash liquidity risk posed by margining generally. ;e company might be pushed 
into a default for lack of cash, which triggers cross defaults to other *nancing ar-
rangements, even though default caused by its underlying business is remote. Histor-
ically, this is the way derivatives have had catastrophic consequences for businesses 
and governments.
An inescapable feature of swaps, even if they are perfectly designed to o,set some 
price risk that is absolutely going to be realized in the future, is that if the business 
or government cannot meet a call for margin, either because a credit threshold has 
been exceeded or because a credit trigger has been tripped, it will likely go bank-
rupt. ;e swap terms will be breached and all other *nancial arrangements that have 
cross default provisions will be breached as well. ;us a swap that poses zero *nan-
cial exposure to a counterparty can also bankrupt that counterparty through credit 
exposure.
;ese risks are poorly understood and almost never valued when businesses and gov-
ernments decide between swap hedging and the use of simpler alternatives. More-
over, these risks are not considered in the academic literature that analyzes the use of 
swaps. ;is is remarkable. From AIG to Je,erson County, Alabama to Enron, credit 
triggers have been the immediate source of swap-induced bankruptcies.
;e unmargined derivatives credit exposures that are widespread in the economy 
are a form of “Ponzi“ *nancing described by the newly revered economist Hyman 
Minsky, whose work foresaw the *nancial crisis.17 He states that *nancing that can 
neither be currently repaid or at least repaid from future identi*able revenues creates 
high levels of instability in the economy. As experienced by AIG and scores of busi-
nesses and governments around the world, there is a high likelihood that margin 
calls cannot be funded by current cash >ow. ;e only way to avoid default is to *nd 
*nancing that replaces the *nancing under the derivatives that has suddenly become 
unavailable. ;is is reminiscent of subprime mortgage loans that were at the center 
of the *nancial crisis. As for AIG, the replacement *nancing came from the US 
taxpayers. 
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Finally, as described above, credit exposures in swaps run both ways. Banks protect 
themselves with margins, thresholds and credit triggers. However, if a business or gov-
ernment transacts a swap with a bank, the credit exposure is equally likely to involve 
an extension of credit to the bank. ;is extension of credit is almost never priced into 
the transaction by the business or government and they rarely bene*t from margin-
ing, threshold and trigger provisions. Since the vast majority of swaps are held by four 
banks, the ability of businesses and governments to negotiate favorable terms is neg-
ligible, even if they understand the risks involved. It is as if the market has concluded 
that no risk of bank default need be considered.  ;e swap counterparties of Lehman 
Brothers might *nd that conclusion particularly unpersuasive.
Advanced  Engineering
For readers who are interested, Appendix A includes a description of two more complex 
forms of derivatives: composite swaps and options. ;ese are extraordinarily important 
concepts, but knowledge of them is unnecessary for following the balance of this paper. 
Summary.  In summary, derivatives share speci*c core characteristics.  In terms of value:
t Derivatives are executory contracts based on the exchange of *nancial conse-
quences of determinable price moves from inception to a date certain. 
t At any point in time, the current *nancial value of the derivative contract 
depends on the expected forward price that is referenced in the derivative.
t ;e realized value of a derivative is dependent on performance at the required 
date.  If, at any time prior to required performance, the performance by one 
counterparty has an accrued positive value based on current forward prices, the 
other party who has accrued that value has extended credit to its counterparty. 
;at credit is valuable to the counterparty who receives it.  It also is a cost to the 
party that extends the credit.
In terms of the use of derivatives, the potential price consequence to a business of future 
price movements is exchanged for a *xed consequence (or another referenced conse-
quence of a price movement). ;e consequence can be either positive or negative. Risk 
of loss and reward of pro*t from price moves are transferred from one counterparty to 
another. 
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n order to understand the a,ect that derivatives have on the capital 
intermediation system, we must identify how derivatives are used. 
It should be obvious that derivatives can be used to place a bet on a 
price move in lieu of buying an asset. For example, a trader desiring 
to speculate on increasing oil prices could buy 100 barrels of oil and 
hold on to them. But he or she would have to pay for storage and transportation costs. 
Alternatively, the trader could enter in to an oil price derivative that increases and de-
creases in value as prices change. 
;is kind of speculation through derivatives is commonplace in all of the derivatives 
markets. Traders at *nancial institutions speculate. But so do retirement funds and en-
dowment funds of colleges and health care institutions. Each of these entities can adopt 
a strategy that seeks out the price risks and rewards of asset ownership and o:en uses 
derivatives to achieve this end.
In this context, derivatives are an important part of the *nancialization of the Ameri-
can economy. Derivatives synthesize ownership. ;ey allow total amount of exposure 
of asset price risk to multiply far beyond the actual assets that exist. ;e potential for 
distortion is great and will be discussed in detail in a subsequent paper that considers 
*nancialization broadly.
Derivatives are also used to o,set price exposures. Banks use them to shi: the con-
sequences of currency and interest changes that could a,ect their role as providers of 
payment intermediation among customers. And many di,erent kinds of businesses and 
governments use them to alter the consequences of price movements to which they are 
exposed in their operations, such as prices of commodities, interest rates and curren-
cies. ;ese uses are referred to as hedges.
Derivatives  as  an  Element  of  Capital  Intermediation
;e capital intermediation function, the core social value a,orded by the *nancial 
system, allows investment funds to be deployed to productive purposes. One element 
of this process is simply matching investors up with capital demand. But the needs of 
investors and consumers of capital are o:en not the same. For instance, investors may 
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want to lend at >oating rates of interest while a borrower may want to have a *xed 
rate. A big part of the services provided by capital intermediaries is to reconcile these 
di,erences. 
As described in the *rst paper of this series, traditional commercial banking provides 
capital intermediation. In that model, banks deploy customer deposits and their own 
capital to fund capital needs in the economy. ;e mismatches between the two, such as 
term, interest rate and credit, are absorbed by the banks’ capital base. If the sources of 
capital and its uses become unbalanced (for example if customers withdraw deposits 
or the bank su,ers loan defaults) the banks’ own capital is available as a cushion. To 
secure integrity of the system, the government provides FDIC deposit insurance to the 
customers to discourage panic withdrawals and the Federal Reserve allows banks to 
borrow at the discount window to provide liquidity.
A second model of capital intermediation is the trading market. ;is has become the 
dominant form of capital intermediation over the last 35 years. ;e trading market 
model can be thought of as an intermediation pipeline, just like the commercial bank 
model. In the “primary market,” a business or company issues new securities into the 
pipeline to raise capital. At the same time investors supply new capital funds by putting 
money into the pipeline to acquire the newly issued securities. 
;e major di,erence with the commercial bank model is that investors can put their 
investment back in the pipeline whenever they wish to, in exchange for cash or replace-
ment investments. ;is is thought of as a major advantage for investors, one that can 
make capital less expensive for productive users of funds raised in the primary market. 
Intermediaries also buy and sell investments that are in the pipeline, intermediating 
the secondary market. ;is is “secondary market” trading, and it is absolutely vital to 
capital intermediation through the trading markets. Without it, investors cannot easily 
trade out of their positions and they cannot anticipate prices if they are considering 
doing so.
Derivatives are an integral part of the trading market intermediation model. ;ey rec-
oncile mismatches between capital sources and uses, typically maturity, interest rate, 
creditworthiness and currency di,erentials. ;ey act just like bank capital reserves in 
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the commercial bank intermediation model. ;is use of derivatives is neither primary 
nor secondary market trading. It is a third form of trading that is integral to capital in-
termediation, but this role is virtually unrecognized in the literature.
For example, a company or government can enter into a derivative contract with a bank 
to synthetically convert the form of an obligation into another form. Using derivatives, 
an investor who seeks a 10-year, *xed rate bond denominated in Euros can be a source 
of funds for a company seeking a >oating rate loan denominated in US dollars. ;e 
company can synthetically convert the bond that the investor wants to buy into funding 
based on terms that the company wants to procure. 
In our example, the company enters into a swap contract with a bank. Under the con-
tract, the company receives payments equal to its *xed rate interest payment obligation; 
and it pays the bank an amount equal to the interest obligation that it would have had 
if the interest obligation had been at a >oating rate. ;e investor is paid its *xed rate 
interest indirectly by the bank and the company pays >oating amounts to the bank. ;e 
company’s obligations denominated in Euros are similarly swapped with the bank for a 
like obligation denominated in US dollars. Capital intermediation has worked and the 
mismatches have been reconciled.
Derivatives are also used to reconcile credit mismatches. Credit default swaps can be 
used to transform credit exposures, as a bank that writes the swap e,ectively becomes 
the guarantor of the credit exposure. 
As discussed herein, businesses and governments can also use derivatives to hedge risks 
embedded in their enterprises. Credit rating agencies o:en urge this use of derivatives. 
Ratings are based on probability of default rather than potential for success. As a result, 
ratings agencies are biased toward derivatives that exchange pro*t potential for cer-
tainty of outcome. ;e agencies reward the reduced potential for default and are un-
concerned about the lost opportunity for pro*t. By securing a favorable credit rating, 
capital can be raised at a lower nominal cost.
As the capital intermediation model has grown relative to commercial bank interme-
diation, the need to reconcile di,erences between sources and uses of capital invest-
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ment using derivatives has also grown. Banks are the dominant source of derivatives for 
businesses and governments. ;erefore, bank balance sheets are still at risk for investor/
capital user mismatches, but not directly as in the commercial bank model. ;ey are at 
risk under the derivatives, a far more complex set of risks than those experienced in the 
commercial bank intermediation model. ;e question is whether this is a good thing or 
bad.
Enterprise  R isk  Hedging
In contrast with speculation, swaps are most o:en used by businesses and governments to 
hedge (meaning o,set) a market price exposure that the business or government experi-
ences in its operations or in its capital structure. Unlike speculation, the value of hedging 
is not derived from market price moves. ;e value is in the o,set between the actual price 
exposure and the synthetic price exposure under the swap. 
Derivatives do not eliminate risk.  ;ey are contracts that exchange one set of future con-
sequences from a price change for another, assuming the other party performs.  Picture a 
business whose pro*t and loss during a period in the future depends on price movements 
of a commodity or security.  In order to avoid the consequences of an adverse price move, 
the business could establish a reserve from borrowings or earnings.  Alternatively, it could 
enter into a swap that (assuming performance by the counterparty) *xes the consequence 
of this price exposure at the current price level. 
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;e distinctions between these alternatives – capital reserves and derivatives - should 
drive the decision between these two methods of managing the risk of price move-
ment.18  ;e use of derivatives is o:en characterized as a “risk reduction” device. 
Instead, it is a contract that is one of a number of devices to alter the consequences to 
an enterprise of an exposure to price changes. If a reserve is used, the business must pay 
for the capital to fund it. If a swap is used, the company pays the value of a bene*cial 
price move if it occurs. ;at value is transferred to a bank counterparty. If a reserve is 
used, the risk is that an adverse price move has consequences beyond the reserve. If a 
swap is used, the basic embedded risk is that the counterparty fails to perform - but 
swaps include many other risks as well.
;e enterprise price risk that is hedged by a derivative occurs sometime in the future, 
presumably at the same time the payments are required under the derivative contract. 
;at re>ects an o,set of one of the basic properties of derivatives, their *nancial value, 
against an experienced outcome of the enterprise. However, the other basic property, 
credit risk extension, comes into play from the inception of the derivative contract. A 
company either funds margin collateral during the term of the derivative contract or it 
receives an extension of credit from the counterparty, which is almost always a bank.
;e business or government could set aside funds as reserves. ;ey could deposit the 
amount it would have been putting up in margin or in the embedded extension of 
credit under the derivative contract if no ongoing margining is required. At the time 
the enterprise price risk is experienced, the company or government would be equally 
protected from a price shock (assuming, of course, that the derivative counterparty 
performs its obligations). However, if it uses a reserve fund it would bene*t from a fa-
vorable price movement. And if it uses a derivative it would not experience a negative 
price shi:. 
;e business or government should be indi,erent between borrowing money to fund 
a reserve and receiving an extension of credit under the derivative. As discussed above, 
a derivative involves an extension of credit, with many of the characteristics of a loan 
to fund a reserve. A bank has *nite capacity to extend credit to any company or gov-
ernment. When it makes a loan, the bank decrements available credit capacity to keep 
track of how much exposure to the borrower has been taken on. Similarly, when the 
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bank enters into a derivative, the embedded credit exposure is decremented from credit 
capacity. Both consume *nite credit capacity, limiting what the business or government 
can borrow for other purposes.
;e question is whether the costs and bene*ts are accurately re>ected in the pricing of 
the contract and the consequences to the two parties.
Since the alternative approach to managing a price exposure is to establish a reserve, 
derivatives can be described as a substitute for capital funding.  ;is is the best way to 
evaluate the e,ects of the derivative innovation on the underlying social purpose of 
the *nancial markets - the e+cient intermediation between capital sources and capital 
uses.  To the extent the use of derivatives rather than capital reserves increases the ef-
*ciency of intermediation, derivatives provide a social value.  To the extent their use 
decreases e+ciency of intermediation, they impose a social cost.
;ere is an important di,erence between conventional credit and credit embedded in 
a derivative, however. In 2007, I made a proposal to the head of an energy division of 
one of the largest banks in the world whose responsibilities included lending to energy 
companies. I suggested that the bank transfer credit capacity for certain companies 
that had been allocated to the bank’s derivatives trading desk to the lending group. 
;is would enable the companies to use loan proceeds to collateralize derivatives credit 
exposures to the bank rather than merely grow them organically by transacting deriv-
atives. It would be done through a system my company had developed to increase the 
e+ciency of derivatives credit management. If the bank charged uniformly for the ex-
tension of credit, it would be indi,erent as to the allocation of the credit capacity since 
the exposure to the bank would be the same.  It appeared to be a matter of form rather 
than substance. But the customer would bene*t from the increased risk management 
e+ciency.
However, the derivatives desk refused to reallocate the credit capacity. ;is was because 
its pro*t from credit extension embedded in derivatives was reportedly ten times the 
pro*t that could be earned from making a loan. ;is con*rmed what was commonly 
understood to be true.19 Because the pricing of derivatives was so complex, customers 
almost never understood how much a bank charged for entering into the derivative.
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;is constitutes a massive distortion of the credit markets. In an e+cient market, 
credit is priced similarly regardless of how it is deployed. As mentioned above, de-
rivatives are used to reconcile di,erences between the needs of the sources and uses 
of capital investment. ;is is an alternative to the commercial bank intermediation 
model. In both cases, the users of capital “rent” the balance sheets of the banks to 
acquire reconciliation. Large di,erences between the rent charged for derivatives and 
the rent charged in the commercial banking intermediation model for the “use” of the 
bank balance sheet constitute an extraction of value from the capital intermediation 
process in excess of the value provided.
Only the banks that overcharge are aware that the overcharging occurs. In order to 
examine pricing, one must compare the original pricing with the market at inception 
of the transaction, and data is di+cult to *nd. However, there are rare glimpses into 
the practice. One was a package of LIBOR swaps entered into by the Denver Public 
Schools as part of a complex *nancing of its pension fund de*cit. LIBOR swaps are 
extremely liquid, and are near commodities. ;e price for a LIBOR swap is low and 
easily tracked.  Andrew Kalotay, the founder of Andrew Kalotay Associates that pro-
vides quantitative analysis of *xed income products, was asked to look into that *-
nancing a:er it collapsed in the wake of the *nancial crisis. Dr. Kalotay is an adjunct 
professor at NYU and serves on the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) 
advisory committee that oversees the certi*cation of municipal advisors. Dr. Kalotay 
testi*ed concerning his investigation before the SEC in a general inquiry on munici-
pal *nance practices.20
Dr. Kalotay determined that the school district was over charged by more than $13.5 
million for the swaps, an immense amount for such a commonplace swap. Troubled 
by his *nding, Dr. Kalotay estimated that state and local governments throughout the 
country had been overcharged by $20 billion in the years 2005 to 2010 by the *nancial 
sector.
Overcharging of private companies is even more obscure. ;ey are less likely to be 
subject to public scrutiny. However, as described above, the evidence of general over-
pricing is compelling.
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Measuring  Derivatives  Effect  on 
Capital  Intermediation  Inefficiency
Overpricing directly a,ects the cost of capital intermediation. But that is only half of 
the analysis. ;e other side of the analysis is the value of the product that businesses 
and governments receive in exchange.
As mentioned, credit capacity is *nite. ;e large disparity in the pro*tability of lending 
and derivatives credit extension means that businesses and governments will be pre-
vented from tapping into capital lending sources or pay more for scarce capacity. It 
would be di,erent if the credit extension were ten times more valuable to the company 
or government than a loan. However, the academic research suggests that this is not the 
case, especially when the research is read in the context of the practical use of deriva-
tives in the marketplace.
;e best sources of relevant knowledge about this issue are the academic studies of the 
choice between using derivatives and using reserves. ;e Gamba and Triantis study 
cited above21 provides the most elaborate comparison of the alternatives.  ;e study 
concludes that the methods produce similar value and that a combination of the two, 
based on speci*c price exposures, is the most rational policy for a company or govern-
ment. Based on the academic analysis, it is clear that derivatives are not ten times more 
valuable, but are in fact comparable to reserves.
Unfortunately, academic study of derivatives uniformly falls short because of the di+-
culty of valuation and an incomplete understanding of the true cost implications of de-
rivatives.  Even in the Gamba and Triantis study, signi*cant valuation issues are omitted. 
First, the study considers only the elimination of a risk and ignores the basic function of 
a derivative as a change in consequences.  It is true that both alternatives – derivatives 
and cash reserves - mitigate the immediate consequences of an adverse price move. 
However, a funded reserve allows a company to pro*t from a favorable price move. If a 
swap is used, in contrast, the value of a favorable price rise is foregone.  ;e derivative 
used to manage price risk could, of course, be constructed as an option so that the value 
beyond the “>oor or cap” described above is not swapped. ;at is to say the bene*t of 
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a favorable price move is retained. To compare risk mitigation methodologies, an 
option should, in fact, be the comparison case since the option value represents the 
potential of a bene*cial price move. Alternatively, if a swap is used, the implied cost 
of foregoing upside measured by option value should be included in the cost compar-
ison. ;e cost of foregoing the potential upside is simply not considered by Gamba 
and Triantis.
Moreover, the use of a swap as a risk management device deprives a business of >exi-
bility, a cost that Gamba and Triantis does not consider. ;is problem is most obvious 
in swaps used to hedge commodity price risk. For example, a business that is exposed 
to the prices of its output can manage the consequences of a price downturn by alter-
ing its operations.  For instance, it can shut down a production line. 
;is operational response can be used if the business manages price risk with re-
serves.  If it uses a swap, however, it must continue the operation as a matched o,set 
to the swap.  If it shuts down a line, the business is exposed to the price movements 
re>ected in the swap payments, with no o,set from product sales. ;e price risk ex-
posure incurred if it shuts down a production line is the mirror image of the risk it 
sought to manage in the *rst case.
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If the operating company shuts down the production line, it remains obligated on the 
swap. This would cause a loss if the price at maturity falls below the fixed payment.
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Note that this loss of >exibility is a cost to the general economy as well as a cost to the 
individual company. In our example, shutting down a production line limits supply to 
the market supporting the price of the product, a self-correcting device that bene*ts 
the entire economy. If the company has entered into a swap, it is incented to continue 
output so that the price movements of the swap are o,set. ;e self-correcting e,ect of 
price moves on production is muted. ;is is a major ine+ciency cost of the derivative 
innovation. It impairs the fundamental forces of price, supply and demand.
;e problem of derivatives market illiquidity is also not considered in Gamba and 
Triantis. ;e utility of a derivative as a hedge depends on the existence of a price ex-
posure to be hedged.  However, circumstances change.  For instance, a plant might be 
closed down unexpectedly, eliminating an exposure to fuel prices.  A company that had 
hedged fuel price risk using a swap is, in that case, exposed to the very risk it sought 
to avoid (fuel price change), with no way to manage it other than to enter a reversing 
swap. If the market accommodates the new, reversing swap, all is well.  But there may be 
no market availability of the reversing swap. Alternatively, limited market availability 
may mean that the reversing swap is available only at a high price.  ;e exposure to the 
liquidity in the derivatives market is a very real cost.  ;is cost is not an issue with a 
reserve, which can be redeployed to other purposes if the fuel price risk in our example 
no longer exists.
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But even if the swap described in the preceding paragraph can be reversed in the market, 
the company would have lost all of the value accrued as prices moved against it from the 
inception of the swap.  ;e reversing swap will be at the new market price, not the price 
at inception.  ;e accrued value of a derivative has no analog in the alternative in which 
a reserve is used.  ;e cost of establishing the reserve is *xed, and can even be reduced 
by liquidating or redeploying the reserve.
In addition, Gamba and Triantis does not address the issue of liquid access to cash.  As 
described above, the extension of credit in the amount of accrued value is embedded in 
every derivative.  It is common practice to require a counterparty to whom credit is ex-
tended to post collateral as security against default.  ;is is o:en referred to as margin. 
Since the amount of credit extended is uncapped and unpredictable, margin can pose 
severe cash liquidity risk to the counterparty.  In a volatile price environment, the chal-
lenge can be greater as prices move by relatively large amounts over short periods of 
time. In the real world, the threat based on the need to access cash immediately is the 
most dangerous element in the use of derivatives. ;e Gamba and Triantis study values 
the credit extension to the company entering into a hedging swap.  But, it does not con-
sider the cash liquidity risk associated with margin collateral.
For most swaps, however, the credit extension is initially uncollateralized, at least up 
to an agreed cap. Almost invariably, swap agreements require immediate and complete 
funding of margin collateral against a credit exposure under certain conditions.  ;e 
most typical is a credit rating downgrade, with the consequence that the company must 
come up with cash at precisely the time that cash di+cult to secure.  ;is ampli*es the 
cash liquidity risk. ;e company might be pushed into a default for lack of cash, which 
triggers cross defaults to other *nancing arrangements, even though default caused by 
its underlying business is remote. Historically, this is the way derivatives have had cata-
strophic consequences for businesses and governments.
Finally, as described above, credit exposures in swaps run both ways.  ;e Gamba and 
Triantis study explicitly assumes that the swap alternative under consideration in the 
study is entered into by the subject company with a bank.  It concludes that no risk of 
bank default need be considered.  ;e swap counterparties of Lehman Brothers might 
*nd that conclusion particularly unpersuasive.
In summary, the study by Gamba and Triantis, while it is the most comprehensive avail-
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able, still runs afoul of the incredible complexity of even a relatively simple swap 
transaction. ;is illustrates clearly that that derivatives are di+cult to value. More 
complex derivatives are even more challenging as additional risks compound the val-
uation problem. It is completely unrealistic to believe that participants in the deriv-
atives markets accurately value the transactions that they enter into. A recent study 
describes this problem:
The practical downside of using derivatives is that they are complex assets 
that are difficult to price. Since their values depend on complex interaction of 
numerous attributes, the issuer can easily tamper derivatives without anybody 
being able to detect it within a reasonable amount of time. Studies suggest 
that valuations for a given product by different sophisticated investment banks 
can be easily 17% apart and that even a single bank’s evaluations of different 
tranches of the same derivative may be mutually inconsistent.22
Under these conditions, it is clear that the very complexity of valuation of deriva-
tives constitutes a major ine+ciency in the intermediation of capital sources and 
capital uses.  Derivatives are a substitute for capital-funded reserves and constitute 
a form of synthetic leverage. ;ey are an integral component of the capitalization of 
many businesses.  No studies have comprehensively valued the use of derivatives as 
a substitute for straightforward capital funding, possibly because valuation is simply 
too great a task.  And it is obvious that the valuation issues are so complex that no 
company or government could practically value the use of a derivative in lieu of re-
serves in an ongoing operation. 
;e inadequate valuation of derivatives imposes ine+ciencies and costs on the in-
termediation of capital in the *nancial markets and contributes to the increased cost 
of intermediation observed by Professor Philippon. Sophisticated banks understand 
valuation far better than their customers. ;is means that prices can never be ad-
equately evaluated. In this way, the *nancial sector extracts value from the *nan-
cial markets through derivatives prices that are never adequately understood by 
customers.
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he Dodd-Frank *nancial reform law addresses deriv-
atives primarily by requiring transparent pricing pro-
cedures and clearing for certain derivatives. Unfortu-
nately, the exceptions to these requirements leave out 
the derivatives that involve the greatest capital market 
ine+ciencies from coverage.
Price transparency is enhanced by requiring certain 
derivatives to be traded on regulated exchanges or on 
“swap execution facilities” that are subject to less stringent requirements. Under the 
*nal regulations implementing the law the e,ectiveness of swap execution facilities will 
be limited. It is very likely that complex derivatives and derivatives that are not widely 
traded will not be traded at exchanges or swap execution facilities.
Dodd-Frank also requires that certain derivatives be cleared. Clearinghouses stand in 
between the two sides of a derivatives contract, entering into mirror contracts with each 
side. ;us, all of the market price risk is held by the two parties that contract with the 
clearinghouse. But the credit risk of performance of each of these parties is held by the 
clearinghouse. ;e clearinghouse manages the credit risk using uniform risk metrics 
and requiring immediate funding of margin collateral. ;is is an upgrade over practices 
that are used in bilateral, un-cleared derivatives.
However, Dodd-Frank excludes “end user” derivatives from the clearing requirement. 
;is exception encompasses virtually all derivatives used to hedge enterprise risk by 
businesses and governments. As a result, much of the cost and risk of the derivatives 
market will remain.
;ese reforms are bene*cial, but far from universal. ;e ine+ciencies of the derivatives 
markets and the cost to capital intermediation will persist.
P R I C E  T R A N S PA R E N C Y 
A N D  C L E A R I N G
T
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ramatic innovations over the last 35 years, especially 
since 2000, have changed trading markets dramatically. 
By far the largest and most dangerous innovation is the 
derivatives market. Derivatives were created and mar-
keted aggressively by the large *nancial institutions that 
dominate trading. ;ese sophisticated market partici-
pants are very well situated to understand the distortions 
and ine+ciencies that are embedded in derivatives. In most cases they are ongoing 
participants in the activities that are required to maintain the markets. 
Armed with superior technological and analytical capabilities and intimate knowl-
edge of distortions and ine+ciencies, these large *nancial institutions are able to 
exploit them. ;ey understand the pricing and valuation of derivatives much better 
than their customers. ;is knowledge advantage is immensely pro*table for them.
;e value that they extract is large. For the most part, it exceeds the value provided 
by the innovations themselves. For example, most studies indicate that the value of 
using derivatives to manage risks is roughly the same as the value of using a reserve 
for the same purpose. But the complexity of even the simplest derivative goes unac-
counted for in the academic literature and in the marketplace. Complexity obscures 
the evaluation of e+cient results. ;erefore, studies that show that the use of deriva-
tives to hedge provides little if any advantage over alternatives omit many costs that 
would tip the scales against derivatives.
;e marketplace is biased toward complexity because it favors market participants 
with asymmetric information advantages and oligopolistic market power. Under 
these circumstances there is an inherent bias toward risk taking by large *nancial 
institutions: the larger the risk, the larger the reward; and if the rewards are structur-
ally higher, immediate pro*ts (which translate in to shareholder value and executive 
compensation) can be seized. ;e periodic catastrophic failure is worth it for traders 
and executives who keep their earnings.
But in the interim, American businesses, governments and the general public su,er. 
Ine+ciencies that transfer earnings to the *nancial sector are like a tax that redistrib-
C O N C L U S I O N S 
A N D  N E X T  S T E P S
D
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utes wealth upward. ;is system cannot persist. Constraints on innovation, especial-
ly innovation in derivatives, based on much greater evaluation of costs and bene*ts, 
are desperately needed.
;e capital intermediation system, and as a result the economy as a whole, would 
bene*t greatly from a reduction of the derivatives markets. A number of regulatory 
measures have been suggested that would move in this direction.
t ;e end user exemption from clearing and price transparency provisions 
of the Dodd-Frank Act could be eliminated or at least interpreted narrow-
ly. ;is exemption was included for political expediency in the debate over 
Dodd-Frank. Businesses and governments with direct access to members of 
Congress continue to support the exemption, but the value that they perceive 
from it is misguided and springs from illegitimate incentives, such as obfus-
cation of debt in disclosure and tax technicalities.
t Pricing of derivatives, especially for state and local governments, must be 
made more transparent and fair. Two measures would improve this situation:
t Generally, state and local governments employ independent advisors 
to evaluate swaps. Many of these advisors are ill equipped to evaluate 
the transactions. Even worse, they are highly susceptible to in>uence 
by banks in direct and indirect ways. ;e Dodd-Frank act requires 
registration of advisors by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board, but the statute omitted the term “*nancial” in its description 
of “advisors.” As a result, implementation of the registration regime 
has been bogged down for years. Immediate registration and a strong 
set of standards would be bene*cial.
t Further, a bureau like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for 
state and local governments is completely justi*ed. ;e mispricing of 
*nancial products, particularly derivatives, to these entities imposes a 
heavy burden on the economy.
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t ;e problem of properly evaluating the use of derivatives by businesses and 
governments is daunting, eluding even *ne scholars who study the matter. 
Derivatives impose dangerous and costly risks that are rarely considered. Ul-
timately, these are risks and costs that are material to investors in these busi-
nesses and governments. Comprehensive disclosure of these risks and costs 
would require the businesses and governments to actually examine them. ;e 
SEC should develop a template for evaluation of these risks and costs and 
require disclosure under its terms. Investor disclosure would improve, but 
even more importantly businesses and governments would be provided the 
tools to understand the consequences of their transactions.
t Accounting rules are directly related to disclosure. Derivatives that are 
used to hedge enterprise risk are given short shri: under accounting rules. 
Accrued value, i.e., mark-to-market value, is disregarded because the ulti-
mate outcome of the derivative is o,set by an exposure that is embedded in 
the enterprise. However, this exposure may or may not be realized.  And, far 
more importantly, during the period prior to the end of the term of the de-
rivative contract, the business or government potentially incurs large and ex-
traordinarily risky debt. ;e existence of this debt is only disclosed indirectly 
and incompletely.  Enhanced accounting rules governing derivatives could 
inform the businesses and governments considering their use of the negative 
potential consequences.
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A P P E N D I X  A 
A D VA N C E D  F I N A N C I A L  E N G I N E E R I N G
Composite  Swaps
Around this basic swap structure, an enormous number of derivatives “products” have 
been *nancially engineered and marketed.  For example, the payment obligation of 
both parties can be derived from values to be determined in the future. ;at is to say the 
swap may require no *xed payment, but instead two >oating payments.  In the context 
of the oil price swap, Party A‘s obligation might be the June price of oil delivered at Los 
Angeles instead of a *xed payment.  Party B’s obligation would be based on the June 
price at Cushing. As a result, the value of the ultimate performance would be the dif-
ference between the changes in June Los Angeles and June Cushing oil prices from the 
swap inception date until June.
;is is the *nancial equivalent of two simple swaps between the parties, executed si-
multaneously but documented as a single swap. ;e *rst of the two swaps is the simple 
Cushing swap described above.  In the second swap, Party B pays the *xed market price 
for Los Angeles oil at the inception date, and Party A pays the actual price in June.  If 
they are done simultaneously, the result is a Los Angeles/Cushing >oating-to->oating 
price swap. Figure 4 illustrates how such a swap would work.   
F I G U R E  A - 1 .  |  C O M P O S I T E  S WA P
If the two swaps are executed as a composite, complex swap, the parties exchange the change 
in the June price of oil at Cushing for the change in the June price of oil at Los Angeles.
Party
A
Party
B
CUSHING SWAP
Net result: A receives and B 
pays change in Cushing price
LOS ANGELES SWAP
Net Result: A pays and B receives
change in Los Angeles price
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;is type of composite swap can be used as a hedge. In our case Party A may be 
a buyer of oil at Cushing and a seller of oil at Los Angeles, and Party B may be a 
buyer in Los Angeles and a seller in Cushing. Each of the two parties has secured 
the *nancial result of buying and selling at the June forward price as of the swap 
inception date for each of the two locations. 
Derivatives that are the composite of simple swaps are a common example of sec-
ond-level *nancial engineering. Almost all complex, engineered swaps can be de-
composed into simpler forms. Indeed, sophisticated *nancial *rms do just this 
when recording and monitoring price and credit risk in their derivatives busi-
nesses.  Unfortunately, many customers of these sophisticated *nancial *rms, and 
worse many regulators, fail to appreciate the simpli*cation provided by the de-
composition of super*cially complex swaps.
Advanced  Engineering  –  Options .  
;e next level of advanced engineering is based on instruments known as “options.” 
;e contract is written as an option to buy (a “call”) or force the sale (a “put”) of 
something, speci*cally a security or a commodity, at a determinable price on (or 
sometimes on a date before) a future date.  It can also be a contract to force the 
other party to enter into a swap, known in the market as a “swaption.”
It is obvious that the option holder will execute on his or her rights if there is value 
in doing so.  If one has the option to buy a barrel of oil at a price of $90 and the 
current price is $100, he or she will exercise the option. It is also typical that the 
value of the item to be obtained or sold is readily calculable and can be converted 
to cash. Otherwise, it would be di+cult to know what the value of the derivative 
was at inception or during its existence. In fact, almost all options are settled at the 
option exercise date based on cash equivalent payments rather than actual pur-
chase and sale of the underlying asset or security. In the example above, instead of 
the option holder buying the oil at $90, the other party pays $10 per barrel.
;erefore, it is useful to ignore the technicality that the contract is structured as 
a right to buy or sell an asset. ;at allows one to think of an option contract as its 
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*nancial equivalent expressed in terms of a swap derivative: a swap in which the net 
cash to be exchanged in the future has a cap or >oor that applies to one of the parties. 
If the cap (or >oor) is breached, performance is excused. (in option parlance the >oor 
or cap is the strike or exercise price.)  ;inking of the transaction as a swap with a cap 
or >oor simply assumes that the “option” will be exercised if it is valuable, which of 
course is the way an option is valued and trades.  
FIGURE A-2. | OPTION AS A SWAP WITH A CAP OR FLOOR
If the price is below $100, the net swap contract payments flow. If it is above, no net 
payments are made. This is the financial equivalent of an option to call barrels of oil @ 
$100 owned by Party A.
Because of the cap or >oor, there is an additional *nancial value that must be calcu-
lated in order to value an option prior to its exercise date, beyond the value of the 
forward price and the value of credit extension.  It is based on the probability, as of 
the date of valuation, that the cap or >oor will be breached at the time payments are 
Party
A
Party
B
Inception price 
of 100 barrels of oil 
in June @ Cushing
June price of 100 
barrels of oil in June at 
Cushing at floor of 
$100
37 t DERIVATIVES | June 2013
required.  ;is is referred to as the “option value.” For example, if the forward price is 
below the exercise price, the option has no forward value to a holder of a right to buy. 
But there is still a chance that actual price on the exercise date will exceed the exercise 
price. ;is probability has valuable. 
;e Black-Scholes Model and its variants are used to calculate the value. ;is ex-
pected value is measured by statistical algorithms. ;e calculation of the value of this 
probability depends in large part on expected price volatility from the date of calcu-
lation up to the performance date. If prices have historically moved so as to exhibit a 
great deal of amplitude, there is a greater chance that a >oor or cap may be breached 
on the performance date of the contract.  Option value is, for this reason, higher in 
volatile markets. Traders, who always believe that they will pro*t from the positions 
they take on, prefer volatile markets because the pro*t potential is relatively higher.
;e best way to think of an option derivative is that, like a swap, it is an exchange of 
consequences.  However, for one side, the positive consequences or negative conse-
quences are limited.  
In the oil price swap example above, Party B might have retained the value of a poten-
tial price drop by using an option in which Party B’s payment was limited to a price 
$1 lower than the price at inception of the option.  For that >oor, Party B would pay 
Party A the option value at inception, re>ecting the probability that Party B’s perfor-
mance will be excused.
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